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History does repeat itself if it comes to how cognitive science develops new research lines. Consider
attention, one of the first experimentally researched psychological phenomenon. While William
James still thought that “everyone knows what attention is,” it took us more than 100 years to
learn that attention is actually not one coherent thing but falls into very different subfunctions,
which again are subserved by various processes. It seems only natural that a young, developing
scientific discipline needs some time to learn how to deal with phenomena, translate them into
useful scientific concepts, and investigate the underlying mechanisms. And yet, we apparently did
not learn much from this quest, as witnessed by the very similar developments in research on
phenomena with a younger history. Developments showing the same problematic tendencies that
have troubled attention research and slowed down its progress for/by many years. In the following,
we shall try to capture the typical way new research lines develop—the analytical approach, as
we call it, by using attention as an example. Then we focus on three pitfalls in this process that
seem particularly difficult to circumvent and present an alternative research strategy—the synthetic
approach.
How Research Lines in Cognitive Science Develop
While it is impossible to capture the rich history of attentional research in a short paragraph, the
developments that were particularly relevant for our argument are sketched in Figure 1 (left panel).
Psychological concepts commonly have a long history in layperson theorizing and philosophy. Both
rely on introspection and thus tend to describe phenomena from a first-person perspective; e.g.,
William James refers to object-oriented attention by saying: “Attention to an object is what takes
place whenever that object most completely occupies the mind” (James, 1899/2008, p. 63). As such
personal-level descriptions are restricted to conscious experience, they are not useful for theorizing
about the underlying processes and for generating hypotheses to guide empirical investigation.
Accordingly, they need to be translated into, and defined bymeans of amore objective systems-level
(or “sub-personal”: Dennett, 1969, following Ryle and Wittgenstein) language—attention becomes
an “attentional system” or “attentional network.”
Attention research took some time to find out that there is not “the attention” but, rather,
different subfunctions that often differ in their operational logic, functional characteristics, and the
neural resources they rely on—just think of spatially focusing, feature integration, and vigilance.
This insight has led to considerable segregation: Researchers working on one subfunction hardly
talk to researchers working on another, use different terminology, gather in different symposia at
different conferences, and publish in different journals. Decades of research on these subfunctions
has increased our insight into the underlying processes, so that for each subfunction a number
of underlying processes can be defined (see lowermost level of the figure). We developed this
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FIGURE 1 | The analytic and the synthetic approach to human cognition. The dominating analytic approach involves translating a real-life phenomenon into a
scientific definition, which later is split into definitions of subfunctions (S1, …. Sn) and mapped onto underlying processes (p1, … pn). The flash signs refer to the three
pitfalls we discuss. The alternative synthetic approach consists in investigating which aspects of different phenomena are accounted for by a particular process. Its
goal is not (necessarily) to account for entire phenomena but, rather, for many aspects of many phenomena by means of the same process.
scenario for attention but similar stories could be told for
other phenomena: The concept of human will saw the same
transition from experience-based personal-level descriptions
to systems-level terminology—will became executive control
(Goschke, 2003). First understood as a single coherent system,
recent research has motivated the distinction between different
subfunctions that rely on different processes (Miyake et al., 2000).
Three Pitfalls
Each step in our sketch had its reasons and was probably
inevitable for a young scientific discipline. And yet, there is little
evidence that younger research lines have learned much from the
less fortunate choices that have been made on the way. We shall
focus on three pitfalls related to the three transitions from one
level to the next, as indicated in Figure 1.
Pitfall #1: Searching for Exhaustive Definitions
Research on human cognition commonly takes its phenomena
from everyday life: people attend to some things but not
to others, which affects their experience and behavior, and
the cognitive sciences need to explain why. The phenomena
are originally described in everyday language, which is highly
context-dependent and scientifically naïve. In everyday life, we
do understand what people mean if they say “I couldn’t attend
class” and “it has come to my attention,” and we do not find it
strange to use the same word to refer to acts of courtesy and a
position assumed in military formation. While using the same
word in all these situations may imply functional commonalities,
there is no a priori reason why it should. Hence, there is no
reason to even try capturing all these different meanings by
one scientific definition and, as the example of attention shows,
the attempt is likely to fail. This may seem obvious, but not
only has attentional research taken quite some time to find that
out, younger research lines seem to run into the exact same
trap. For instance, creativity researchers still aim to develop tests
assessing and models covering “the creativity”—endeavors that
we consider likely to fail.
Pitfall #2: Identifying Processes with
Subfunctions
Cognitive researchers find out how phenomena/functions
work by identifying the underlying processes. Unfortunately,
however, this is often accompanied by assuming a one-to-one
mapping between the particular function and the respective
set of processes—which then become a “feature-integration
mechanism” or an “inhibition network.” This strategy has some
unfortunate consequences.
Among other things, it implies that the underlying processes
are specific to the particular subfunction and not shared
by other subfunctions. But this is very unlikely and, as for
instance a recent meta-review on the links between emotions
and brain structures (Lindquist et al., 2012) shows, often
inconsistent with the empirical evidence. The differentiation
of phenomena into subfunctions is commonly based on the
insight that the respective subfunctions are not the same,
which does not mean that they have nothing in common.
For instance, there is a widespread agreement that processing
in the brain follows a winner-takes-all logic, which means
that the activation or selection of one representation or state
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leads to the suppression of its competitors (Bogacz, 2007).
This mechanism is likely to be an important ingredient of
target selection, an important subfunction of attention, but
also likely to be important for distractor suppression, feature
integration, memory retrieval, or emotion regulation. Hence,
being essential for one subfunction does not prevent a process
from contributing to other subfunctions as well. The practical
problem this raises is that researchers working on different
subfunctions are likely to deal with the same processes without
even knowing (given the segregation of researchers), which is
why models in different subareas often have a rather similar
architecture (e.g., almost all areas have dual-route processing
models). A good example for this (understandable, given the
research strategy) mutual ignorance is work on attention-
switching and on theory of mind. While researchers from both
communities have favored the temporo-parietal junction as
one key system for their phenomena for some time already,
efforts to appreciate and explain this commonality have been
taken only recently (Geng and Vossel, 2013). Other recent
efforts to overcome the limitations of earlier function-to-process
mapping approaches can be found in the discussions on the
mirror neuron system (Michael, 2011) and the role of the
amygdala.
A concrete example for the problems that the identification of
processes with their subfunctions can create comes from our own
research. On the one hand, divergent thinking (a component of
creativity) relies on striatal dopamine and can thus be improved
by increasing the dopaminergic level. On the other hand, positive
mood is associated with the striatal dopamine level. According
to the analytical approach, this would render dopamine both
a “creativity process” and a “mood process.” While that seems
just a semantic issue, it does become relevant when trying to
show (as we did) that increasing the dopamine level improves
divergent thinking and reviewers require one to rule out that
this is a mood effect. We are afraid that this problem is more
general than one may think. If we consider that phenomena
are derived from context-dependent everyday language, there is
no reason to assume that concepts like attention, motivation,
will, or emotion do not share any processes. But if they do, it
makes little sense to pit one concept against another in empirical
research. That is, it is logically impossible to decide whether
some experimental effect was “attentional,” “motivational,” or
“emotional” in nature, because this very nature is likely to
overlap.
Pitfall #3: Specializing in Phenomena Rather than
Processes
As we have pointed out, researchers segregate according
to the phenomena (or subfunctions) they are interested in.
Segregation as such is difficult to avoid, as the sheer amount
of work and the increasing methodological sophistication
in all related areas makes it impossible to be on top of
things in a whole discipline. What we find problematic,
however, is the criterion for segregation. As we have pointed
out, using phenomena or subfunctions as criterion creates
various problems, including parallel attempts to reinvent
wheels and building models of very similar structure
without even knowing. Avoiding that requires a necessary
counterweight, which we suggest can be provided by a synthetic
approach.
The Synthetic Approach
According to our analysis, circumventing the three discussed
pitfalls requires not to: (a) search for exhaustive definitions
and complete models; (b) identify processes with phenomena;
and (c) specialize in phenomena. As the dominating analytic
approach makes avoiding all that difficult, if not impossible,
another approach is needed. In his book “Vehicles,” Braitenberg
(1984) suggests replacing the analytical from-complex-to-simple
perspective by a synthetic from-simple-to-complex approach.
He introduces the latter by means of an extended thought
experiment, in which he considers construing artificial creatures
and contemplates about the psychological phenomena the
behavior of these creatures would evoke in the naïve observer.
Even surprisingly simple mechanisms, so he argues, may
account for rather complex-looking phenomena. We do not
advocate this particular empirical approach but find the
theoretical attitude very promising. We therefore shall freely
translate this attitude into an alternative research strategy that
does not take phenomena but basic processes as a starting
point.
As we have argued, basic processes (irrespective of the
particular level or grain size at which they are defined) are
likely to contribute to multiple subfunctions and phenomena.
A synthetic approach could therefore start with a given basic
process and investigate which aspects of which phenomena
this process may account for. As an example, we and our
colleagues have applied the rather simple idea that individuals
may differ with respect to the degree of exclusivity to which the
neural winner-takes-all principle is applied: some may strongly
favor one representation over all competing representations,
while others may only weakly favor one representation over its
competitors. If so, this would predict systematic individual and
group differences in performance profiles with respect to any
phenomenon that is sensitive to this neural principle. Indeed,
such differences were found with respect to phenomena as
different as attentional control (Colzato et al., 2010), social
cognition (Sellaro et al., 2014), creative thinking (Colzato
et al., 2015a), meditation (Colzato et al., 2015b), and religious
belief (Hommel et al., 2011)—e.g., religious beliefs favoring
individualistic, exclusive thinking and decision-making lead
to more attention to detail, better suppression of irrelevant
information, less social integration, and greater patience than
religious beliefs favoring collectivistic, inclusive processing.
Note that such a process-centered, synthetic approach does
not provide an exhaustive model of the phenomena being
considered (e.g., it would be hopeless to try explaining all aspects
of religious belief by referring to a single neural principle).
That is, it is far from accounting for all the variance of even a
single to-be-explained phenomenon, but it does account for some
variance of many different phenomena, as indicated in the right
panel of Figure 1. In associating the same process with different
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phenomena, this approach also avoids identifying a process with
a particular phenomenon, and the systematic search through
different phenomena avoids phenomenon-specific specialization.
It also comes with challenges, as it requires expertise in
various experimental paradigms and theoretical frameworks, and
publications in different journals with different customs. And yet,
we are convinced that cognitive science would be well served
by taking our historical lessons to heart and avoid repeating
at least the most obstructive detours on the way to a deeper
understanding of human cognition.
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